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STATE INTERVENTION IN PREGNANCY
On April 18, 1991, a Florida appellate court upheld Jennifer John-
son's conviction for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. The
minor was her newborn infant, and the method of delivery was through
the umbilical cord in the sixty to ninety second period immediately
following birth. Johnson told her obstetrician that she had used crack
cocaine that morning while she was in labor.'
There have been at least sixty women across this country who have
been criminally charged for substance abuse during pregnancy. 2 A ma-
jority of Americans support such prosecutions, 3 but the Johnson case
was the first time an appellate court has ever upheld such a conviction.
Most courts have stated that the drug delivery statutes routinely used
by prosecutors were never intended for such purpose and have referred
the problem back to state legislatures for clearer directives.
There are other available responses to the problem of maternal
substance abuse. Some of these are committing the mother to a hospital
for the duration of the pregnancy, confinement to jail for the duration
of the pregnancy, or removing the child from the mother after birth.
Prosecutors like the one in the Johnson case have recently been turning
to the option of prosecuting mothers after birth, presumably because
the already existing methods of state intervention are not working well
enough. Whichever option is chosen, the state is intervening in a delicate
situation in an attempt to protect the life and health of the child.
Pregnancy presents a unique scenario in a legal system used to
dealing with individual rights. In the situation of pregnancy, the rights
at stake are more complicated than those of a single individual. The
mother has rights as an individual, and the state has interest in the
protection of fetal life. Because of the nature of pregnancy, one potential
Copyright 1992, by LoUislANA LAW REwjw.
I. Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 1991) (Cobb, J.,
concurring). The prosecution used Fla. Stat. § 893.13(l)(c), which states in pertinent part:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 18 years
of age or older to deliver any controlled substance to a person under the age
of 18 years, or to use or hire a person under the age of 18 years as an agent
or employee in the sale or delivery of such a substance, or to use such person
to assist in avoiding detection or apprehension for a violation of this chapter.
2. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 893.13(l)(c) (West Supp. 1992). Rorie Sherman, Courts Disagree
on Mothers' Liability, Nat'l L.J., May 13, 1991, at 30.
3. Rorie Sherman, Bioethics Debate, Nat'l L.J, May 13, 1991, at 1. A National
Law Journal/Lexis poll showed that 52% of Americans believe a mother should be held
criminally liable when her substance abuse results in impairment of her child.
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life which is completely powerless to protect itself is subordinated to
the will of another. Due to this relationship, controlling what a pregnant
woman does with her body is in reality a difficult if not impossible
task. But because of the great need to protect the unborn child, states
have formulated different plans to prevent maternal substance abuse-
civil commitment to a hospital, jail confinement during pregnancy, child
abuse proceedings after birth, and criminal prosecution of the mother
after birth.
This comment will address the constitutionality and wisdom of choos-
ing the option of criminalization of maternal substance abuse. 4 It will
first discuss the physical effects of cocaine use on the fetus, the history
of such prosecutions, and the statutes some states have recently enacted
to more directly address the problem.' It will then discuss the consti-
tutionality of criminalization of maternal substance abuse. Finally, it
will address whether criminalization is an effective method of addressing
this problem and whether the other methods of state intervention are
more promising.
I. DnIENsioNs OF THE PROBLEM OF MATERNAL CocAm ABUSE
A. What Are the Numbers?
Fetal abuse has always been a serious problem, but the current
popularity of crack, a cheap and highly addictive cocaine derivative,
has made the situation even more dire. 6 Though estimates vary, the
number of pregnant women who use cocaine is high. In major cities
such as New York, many hospitals estimate that twenty percent or more
of the babies delivered there have been exposed to drugs in utero.7
Experts estimate that eleven percent of pregnant women have used illegal
drugs during their pregnancy, and of that eleven percent, seventy-five
percent have used cocaine.'
The actual number of infants exposed to drugs was estimated by
two different sources based on the results of the same study. Taking
the low and high numbers from each assessment, between 350,000 and
739,200 infants are born each year having been exposed to one or more
4. Michele Magar, The Sins of the Mothers, Student Law., Sept. 1991, at 30.
S. This comment addresses the issue of maternal substance abuse by focusing ex-
clusively on cocaine as an example, but the same arguments would apply to other illegal
substances as well.
6. Legal Interventions During Pregnancy; Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and
Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663,
2666 (1990) [hereinafter Interventions].
7. Anastasia Toufexis, Innocent Victims. Time, May 13, 1991, at 56, 57.
8. Interventions, supra note 6, at 2666.
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illicit drugs.9 These statistics indicate a huge problem exists in this country
today, and current methods of deterrence are not working satisfactorily.
B. How Does Cocaine Affect the Fetus?
Cocaine reaches the fetal bloodstream by crossing the placenta after
maternal use, and it can have serious effects on the fetus.'" Cocaine
constricts the blood vessels, thereby reducing the flow of blood and
other nutrients. Since fetal cells multiply greatly during the early months
of pregnancy, early maternal cocaine use can cause severe damage to
the fetus."
Cocaine is not a physically addictive drug like heroin or other opiate
drugs; rather, it is habit-forming.' 2 When a pregnant woman uses cocaine,
the derivative benzoylecgonine is found in the infant's blood. Cocaine
remains in the user's bloodstream anywhere from forty-two to seventy-
two hours. Thus, for a woman to give birth to a child with cocaine in
its blood, she would have had to ingest cocaine within seventy-tw6 hours
prior to birth."
Pre-natal exposure to cocaine can cause strokes in utero and spon-
taneous abortions. It also increases the infant mortality rate in other
ways. Even those cocaine babies who live have, on the average, lower
birth weights, shorter body lengths at birth, and smaller head circum-
ferences.' 4 This unusually small head circumference is associated with
low IQ scores."' Cocaine-exposed infants can also experience irritability
and a resistance to interaction with other babies.' 6 This resistance to
interaction is caused because cocaine affects the brain chemistry by
9. Ira J. Chasnoff, Drugs, Alcohol, Pregnancy, and the Neonate; Pay Now or Pay
Later, 266 .JAMA 1565, 1567 (1991) [hereinafter Drugs]. The National Institute on Drug
Abuse performed household surveys in 1988 and 1990. Both the Institute of Medicine
and the team of Gomby and Shiono did studies based on these surveys. The Institute of
Medicine estimated that between 350,000 and 625,000 exposed newborns are born each
year, while Gomby and Shiono placed the number at between 554,400 and 739,200.
10. Drug-Exposed Infants, 86 Pediatrics 639 (1990) [hereinafter Drug-Exposed).
II. Toufexis, supra note 7, at 59.
12. Brian C. Spitzer, Comment, A Response to "Cocaine Babies"-Amendment of
Florida's Child Abuse and Neglect Laws to Encompass Infants Born Drug Dependent,
15 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 865, 878 (1987). Cocaine is a habit-forming drug rather than a
physically addictive one, like heroin. For purposes of this paper, cocaine abuse is referred
to as an "addiction" because the psychological habit is so strong, even though in a purely
medical sense cocaine use is not physically addictive.
13. Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 Harv. Women's L.J. 278,
282 (1990).
14. Drugs, supra note 9, at 1567-68, citing B. Zuckerman, D.A. Frank, R. Hingson,
et al., Effects of Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal Growth, 320 New Eng.
J. Med. 762-68 (1989).
15. Toufexis, supra note 7, at 59.
16. Id. at 60.
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altering the activity of neurotransmitters, which help control mood and
responsiveness. This can explain the impulsiveness and moodiness found
in some cocaine babies as they develop. Another manifestation of this
alteration is that cocaine babies are often unable to distinguish between
their mothers and strangers. 7 This is especially harmful because the
natural bond between child and mother can be impaired. However,
unlike many infants exposed to heroin and other drugs in utero, infants
exposed to cocaine often exhibit no withdrawal symptoms, and a specific
cocaine-withdrawal syndrome has not been clearly defined in infants."
A study at the University of California at San Diego of eighty-two
drug-exposed infants showed that one-third have lesions of the brain,
usually in areas that govern learning and thinking. A similar percentage
of babies who are ill but who have not been exposed to drugs have
these brain lesions, but only five percent of healthy newborns do.19
Researchers believe that infants exposed to cocaine in utero will be more
likely to experience learning disabilities. 20
In most cases, nobody knows exactly how these children will be
affected, and this is a hotly debated subject among doctors. Some believe
that the infants are irreversibly harmed, while others feel that with
intensive treatment, cocaine babies can lead normal lives.', Surprisingly,
only a small percentage of babies exposed to cocaine in utero will develop
serious problems later because of the exposure." One major problem is
that doctors are unable to tell which exposed infants will require intensive
treatment. This means that all babies born addicted to cocaine must be
tested and monitored for numerous potential problems. Therefore, hos-
pital costs for the care of these infants are astounding.
C. How Much Does Care for These Babies Cost?
A recent study compared hospital costs for the care/treatment of
cocaine-exposed newborns and non-exposed infants. The study found
that, on the average, neonatal costs were $5200 more for cocaine-exposed
babies than for unexposed ones. These costs were concentrated among
infants suffering serious illnesses requiring intensive care stays.23 Cocaine
17. Id. A foster mother of a cocaine baby stated: "You don't do things that come
naturally. The more you bounce them and coo at them, the more they arch their backs
to get away."
18. Drug-Exposed, supra note 10, at 639-40.
19. Toufexis, supra note 7, at 60.
20. Interventions, supra note 6, at 2666.
21. Toufexis, supra note 7, at 60.
22. Brenda Coleman, Cocaine Babies' Hospital Costs Exceed $500 Million Annually,
Alexandria Daily Town Talk, Sept. 18, 1991, at AS.
23. Ciaran S. Phibbs, David A. Bateman, Rachel M. Schwartz, The Neonatal Costs
of Maternal Cocaine Use, 266 JAMA 1523 (1991).
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babies were fifty percent more likely than unexposed babies to require
neonatal ICU stays and more than twice as likely to have very low birth
weights.24 The study predicted that for 1990, the national cost for medical
care for these infants was $504 million.25
Another cost to be considered is that of special education for many
of these children, who will have learning disabilities as a result of their
mothers' drug abuse. Pediatrician Evelyn Davis says that these children
can definitely be taught to lead normal lives, if society is willing to pay
the costs.26 In Boston, Massachusetts, one year of special education for
a drug-exposed child can cost $13,000, compared with the $5,000 cost
of regular schooling. 27 A Harvard pediatrician states, "If we worked
with these infants from the first, it would cost us one-tenth or one-
hundredth as much as it will cost us later. To educate them, to keep
them off the streets, to keep them in prisons will cost us billions." 28
A workable solution to this problem could not only ease the suffering,
but could reduce the cost.
Il. HISTORY OF CRIMINALIZATION OF MATERNAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
The first criminal prosecution for maternal substance abuse was
brought in 1985 against Pamela Rae Stewart. 29 Stewart was prosecuted
under a child support statute for failing to follow her doctor's instruc-
tions to abstain from using amphetamines and having sexual intercourse,
and to seek medical attention if she began to hemorrhage." She gave
birth to a brain dead child who only lived for several weeks. The case
was ultimately dismissed on grounds that the statute utilized by the
prosecution was not designed to include this type of behavior.
Unlike the lack of support theory used in Stewart, the prosecutor
in the Johnson case, referred to at the beginning of this article, suc-
cessfully argued that Jennifer Johnson had "delivered" cocaine to her
baby through the umbilical cord immediately following birth.3' The court
emphasized the fact that Johnson had voluntarily ingested cocaine,
24. Id. at 1524.
25. Id. at 1525.
26. Toufexis, supra note 7, at 59.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. People v. Pamela Rae Stewart, No. M508197 (San Diego Mun. Ct. 1987); Moss,
supra note 13, at 279.
30. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization
of "Fetal Abuse," 101 Harv. L. Rev. 994, 994-95 (1988). Stewart responded that she
was unable to care for her children from bed, and she did not go to the hospital after
she began bleeding because she had medication that had stopped the bleeding on prior
occasions.
31. Johnson v. Florida, 578 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 1991).
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"knowing it would pass to her fetus and knowing (or should have
known) that birth was imminent. She is deemed to know that an infant
at birth is a person, and a minor, and that delivery of cocaine to the
infant is illegal. '"32 The court felt it had no choice but to interpret the
delivery statute strictly, and it certified the question to the legislature.
The dissent in Johnson focused on the fact that there was no evidence
of an actual delivery of drugs between mother and child. The prosecution
presented no evidence that cocaine was actually transferred to the infant
through the umbilical cord. The dissent also pointed out that Johnson
could not have timed her ingestion of cocaine to have it delivered to
the infant.33 Had she gone into labor one or two days later, no pros-
ecution would have occurred. The dissent also reasoned that the legis-
lature had never intended for the drug delivery statute to be put to this
use. 4
Prosecutors have used this delivery theory in other cases, such as
State v. Gra)" and People v. Hardy.36 In both of these cases the courts
dismissed the argument on the grounds that legislatures did not intend
for this type of behavior to be punished under such statutes. In response
to these decisions, several states have enacted statutes specifically pun-
ishing women for ingesting cocaine or other controlled substances during
pregnancy.' These statutes are being used in abuse and neglect pro-
ceedings to remove custody of the infant, at least temporarily, from
the mother.
For example, Oklahoma has modified the definition of "deprived
child" to include a child born in a condition of dependence on a
controlled substance.38 Minnesota now defines "neglect" as including
"prenatal exposure to a controlled substance." 39 In Indiana, a child is
in need of services" if it is born with "an addiction to a controlled
substance or a legend drug.'"4 Nevada 4' and Florida'2 have enacted
32. Id.
33. Id. at 423 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
34. Id. (Sharp, J., dissenting).
35. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1972).
36. People v. Hardy, 188 Mich. App. 305, 469 N.W.2d 50 (1991).
37. Moss, supra note 13, at 292. "Punishing" involves including maternal substance
abuse among the reasons for which abuse or neglect proceedings can be instituted, but
does not include actual criminalization through specific statutes.
38. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1101(4)(c) (West 1990) ("Deprived child" means a
child "who is a child in need of special care and treatment because of his physical or
mental condition including a child born in a condition of dependence on a controlled
dangerous substance ... ").
39. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.556, subd. 2(c) (West Supp. 1992).
40. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-4-3.1(1)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
41. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 432B.330(l)(b) (1991) ("A child is in need of protection if:
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similar statutes. Other states have enacted laws which require physicians
to report the birth of any child which the physician has reason to suspect
may have been exposed to drugs in utero.43 States have specifically
expanded their abuse and neglect statute definitions to include situations
in which a child is born addicted to or having been exposed to controlled
substances.
These laws adopt a civil response to the problem of cocaine-exposed
infants. Such laws which specifically include prenatal drug exposure
within the definition of neglect are used to provide more social services
for these families or to remove some infants from their mothers. Al-
though there are no such statutes in existence today, some states are
now considering enacting criminal statutes which would specifically cover
the problem of drug-exposed newborns. Such statutes would not en-
counter the problem of application that prosecutors have faced in past
cases."
Louisiana is one of the states which has not yet addressed this
problem, either jurisprudentially or statutorily. The rest of this comment
will assume that Louisiana has enacted a statute under which a woman
can be prosecuted for giving birth to a drug-addicted infant. 45 Assuming
... [hle is suffering from congenital drug addiction or the fetal alcohol syndrome, because
of the faults or habits of a person responsible for his welfare.").
42. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 415.503(9)(aX2) (West Supp. 1992).
"Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when the parent or other
person responsible for the child's welfare: (iinflicts .... upon the child physical
.. injury. Such injury includes ... [pjhysical dependency of a newborn infant
upon any drug controlled in Schedule I ... provided that no parent of such
a newborn infant shall be subject to criminal investigation solely on the basis
of such infant's drug dependency.
43. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 846 (West Supp. 1992) ("Every physician or surgeon
... attending the birth of a child who appears to be a child born in a condition of
dependence on a controlled dangerous substance shall promptly report the matter to the
county office of the Department of Human Services .... ).
44. In People v. Hardy, the court declined to uphold Ms. Hardy's conviction for
delivering cocaine to her fetus on the ground that it did not believe the legislature meant
to include maternal cocaine use within the ambit of the cocaine delivery statute. The
Court of Appeals of Michigan stated:
A court should not place a tenuous construction on this statute to address
* a problem to which legislative attention is readily directed and which it can
readily resolve if in its judgment it is an appropriate'subject of legislation.
The Legislature is an appropriate forum to discuss public policy, as well as
the complexity of prenatal drug abuse, its effect upon an infant, and its cri-
minalization.
People v. Hardy, 188 Mich. App. 305, 309-10, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1991). This can be
seen as an invitation to the state legislature to enact a statute specifically criminalizing
maternal substance abuse.
45. Since there are no existing maternal substance abuse statutes on which to model
this example, I will use one of the abuse and neglect statutes which are used in civil
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such a statute existed, would it be constitutional? The predominant
constitutional challenges against these types of statutes are equal pro-
tection claims and violation of the maternal right to privacy.
III. CONSTITUTIONALY
Pregnancy presents an interesting constitutional issue in that the
mother, an individual, contains the fetus, a potential individual, inside
her body. Though a fetus is not considered a person,"6 courts have held
that a fetus can have certain rights under certain circumstances .4  The
issue becomes whether the state can constitutionally constrain a woman's
activity pre-birth in order to protect the child. Though possession and
distribution of drugs is properly criminalized, the status of addiction is
not." A woman addicted to cocaine cannot be criminally prosecuted
for her status as an addict. But when her addicted status also affects
her unborn child, the situation becomes different. This no longer belongs
in the "victimless" crime category, although the victim cannot technically
be considered a person. This interdependence is the framework within
which a constitutional analysis of laws affecting pregnancy must take
place.
A. Equal Protection Analysis
The Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. '"49 This
has been interpreted by courts to mean that any statute discriminating
against a class of persons must be scrutinized to determine if it complies
with the amendment. The Court applies different levels of scrutiny
depending upon the nature of the class which is allegedly being dis-
criminated against. Statutes involving gender discrimination receive an
intermediate level of scrutiny.10 Gender-based classifications must there-
situations. (Examples of these statutes are found in footnotes 37-42.) The two main types
of these abuse and neglect statutes are those which define neglect as neonatal addiction
to a controlled substance, and those which define it as fetal exposure to a controlled
substance. I will address both of these types of statutes.
46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
47. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. Ill, 115, 293 N.W.2d 736, 738-39 (1980) ("This
limited recognition of a child en ventre sa mere as a child in esse is appropriate when
it is for the child's best interest ... (and) [slince a child has a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body, [citation omitted) it is within this best interest to examine
all prenatal conduct bearing on that right.").
48. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962) (the "status" of
addiction as a criminal offense constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); but cf. Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968).
49. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I.
50. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
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fore "serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives.""
Maternal drug abuse statutes arguably single out women for pun-
ishment. Most of the defects sought to. be prevented by these statutes
result from maternal cocaine use during pregnancy. Thus, to a certain
degree, nature dictates this singling out of women. But what about men
who supply these pregnant women with drugs? They are effectively
contributing to the harm caused to the fetus. Further, evidence also
indicates that the sperm of male substance abusers can cause defects in
infants even if the mother herself does not use drugs. 2 If more research
is done, and it is conclusively proven that paternal cocaine abuse can
affect the fetus, then fathers should be equally liable under such laws.
The Court in Michael M. v. Superior Court" faced an equal pro-
tection challenge against a rape statute making only men liable for
statutory rape. The Court upheld the statute, noting that some statutes
which discriminate based on the fact that the sexes are simply not
similarly situated can pass constitutional muster in some circumstances.
The Court also quoted Rinaldi v. Yeager," stating that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not "demand that a statute necessarily apply equally
to all persons" or require "things which are different in fact ... to
be treated in law as though they were the same."" Thus the Court has
specifically upheld statutes which discriminate against a gender based
on a fundamental and realistic difference between men and women.
Pregnancy is obviously such a realistic and fundamental difference.
The Court in Geduldig v. Aiello 6 upheld a California disability statute
which excluded from coverage disabilities relating to pregnancy. The
Court said this was not a distinction based on gender, but rather one
based on pregnancy. It simply excluded those individuals who were
pregnant from coverage rather than all women.
The obvious counter-argument to the reasoning in Geduldig is that
only women can become pregnant, so in that sense women are limited
in a way that men can never be. If this insurance coverage is an important
factor in a woman's life, her choice to become pregnant may be restricted
51. Id. at 197, 97 S. Ct. at 457.
52. See Janny Scott, Study Finds Cocaine Can Bind to Sperm, L.A. Times, Oct. 9,
1991, at At. This study found that cocaine can bind to human sperm without impairing
the sperm's mobility or survival. The research is currently in very early stages, and the
results are not conclusive that paternal cocaine use could damage a fetus. But animal
studies have shown that male mice exposed to cocaine and methadone seem to run a
higher risk of birth defects than unexposed mice.
53. 450 U.S. 464, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981).
54. 384 U.S. 305, 86 S. Ct. 1497 (1966).
55. Id. at 309, 86 S. Ct. at 1499 (citing Tigner v. State of Texas, 310 U.S. 141,
147, 60 S. Ct. 879, 882 (1940)).
56. 417 U.S. 484, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974).
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by this statute. In this context, the distinction between pregnant and
non-pregnant women is a distinction based on gender.
Thus, a statute that punishes women for giving birth to drug-addicted
babies could be seen in two ways-as a distinction based on gender, or
as a distinction based on pregnancy, as in Geduldig. Regardless of how
the statute would be classified, the highest level of scrutiny afforded it
would be the intermediate level, which requires important governmental
objectives and means substantially related to 'achieving those objectives."
The governmental interest is the protection of potential human life, and
this objective is undoubtedly an important one. The analysis would
question whether punishing women who give birth to drug-addicted
babies is substantially related to the goal of protecting human life. There
is a persuasive argument that it is. Since the mother is in the best
situation to protect her infant, controlling her behavior would be sub-
stantially related to the protection of the child.
In conclusion, criminal maternal substance abuse statutes would
probably survive an equal protection attack. A solution to any such
attack would be to enact gender-neutral statutes which punish men as
well as women for the harm to the infants." These statutes would punish
those men who abuse substances and then father children who are
ultimately harmed because of that paternal abuse. Enforcement of this
type of statute against men would be problematic. The issue of causation
would be difficult to prove-that the drugs ingested by the father were
in fact the cause of the damage suffered by the infant. Since the fetus
is actually- physically connected to the mother, causation is much more
direct. Anything the mother takes into her body will also eventually
enter the child's body. But the only contact the father has with the
fetus in utero is through his sperm. The prosecution would therefore
be required to prove that at the time of conception the father was
abusing substances, that the sperm contributing to the formation of this
child was affected by that abuse, and that the damage the child suffered
resulted from that affected sperm, and not any of the myriad other
causes of fetal deformation. There would obviously be very few con-
victions of men under this type of statute. But such a statute would
eliminate the equal protection claim that maternal substance abuse sta-
tutes single out women for punishment.
Another claim that is being made against such statutes is that they
violate a woman's Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy, recognized
under Roe v. Wade. 9 This type of challenge has a greater potential for
success than the equal protection challenge.
57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
58. James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment
for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1103, 1132 (1991).
59. 410 U.S. 113. 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
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B. Privacy Violations
The cases that have addressed the issue of maternal substance abuse
have pivoted on whether the alleged conduct falls within the ambit of
the particular criminal statute. Consitutional implications of such statutes
have never been discussed, but commentators seem to agree that the
correct analysis is under the framework established in Roe v. Wade.6"
1. What Does Roe Mean and How Have Subsequent Cases
Affected Its Meaning?
The Court in Roe faced a challenge to a Texas criminal statute
which prohibited abortions at any stage of pregnancy except to save
the life of the mother. The plaintiffs claimed that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment encompassed a personal "liberty" right, which included a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy."1 The Court noted that while the
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy, "the Court
has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.' The
Court then found that this right to privacy does encompass a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy. The opinion went on to qualify that
right by recognizing that the state also has legitimate interests in reg-
ulating abortions-protection of the mother's health, maintenance of
medical standards, and protection of potential human life. 6'Since this privacy interest is a fundamental right, the Court applied
a strict scrutiny analysis to the statute, stating that the state interest
must be compelling and the statute narrowly drawn to further those
interests."
According to Roe, a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment . 5 The Court specifically stated that it
60. Rebecca Manson & Judy Marolt, Comment, A New Crime, Fetal Neglect: State
Intervention to Protect the Unborn-Protection at What Cost?, 24 Cal. W. L. Rev. 161,
165 (1987-1988); Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Comment, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-
Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 505, 513, 516
(1990); Note, supra note 30, at 996.
61. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129, 93 S. Ct. at 715.
62. Id. at 152, 93 S. Ct. at 726. The Court has recognized a right to privacy with
respect to contraception both within and outside of marriage. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972) (outside of marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) (within marriage). But cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental rights of ho-
mosexuals). The Court has also recognized a basic right to reproduction. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942). However, the Court had never discussed
whether this right of privacy extended to a woman seeking an abortion.
63. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
64. Id. at 155, 93 S. Ct. at 728.
65. Id. at 158, 93 S. Ct. at 729.
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was not required in this particular case to decide at what point life
begins," but then outlined the trimester framework as the basis of its
holding. During the first trimester of pregnancy, the state cannot regulate
abortion at all. The state's legitimate interest in the health of the mother
becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester. During the second
trimester the state can implement regulations which bear some rational
relationship to the preservation of maternal health. The state's interest
in potential life becomes compelling at viability, when the fetus is capable
of living separately from its mother. After viability a state may prohibit
abortions except to save the life of the mother.67
This trimester framework has been criticized since Roe." The most
recent case, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,69 does not expressly
overrule Roe, but makes its holding seem tenuous. In Webster, a Missouri
abortion statute which prohibited state employees from performing abor-
tions and banned the use of public facilities for performing abortions
was challenged. The Court upheld this part of the statute, finding that
the statute did not burden the right of procreation.70 The most important
aspect of the Webster case is that a plurality of the Court explicitly
rejected the trimester system of Roe as unworkable. The main proponent
of this idea was Justice O'Connor, who stated that the state's interest
in protecting potential life is compelling throughout pregnancy. The
cases since Roe have chipped away at its holding, and the future of
the trimester system seems shaky at best. With the present composition
of the Court, many believe that Roe will soon be expressly overruled,7
and that a woman, with few exceptions, 2 will not have a right to have
an abortion. However, the fact that Roe is still controlling in Louisiana
has been recently affirmed.
Sojourner v. Roemer,73 a recent Louisiana case, granted an injunction
of the Louisiana abortion statute, citing Roe. In a brief opinion, the
district court stated that it felt it had no choice but to follow Roe,
since it had not been expressly overruled. In light of this case, Roe is
66. Id. at 159, 93 S. Ct. at 730.
67. Id. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.
68. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
69. 492 U.S. 490, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
70. Id. at 495-96, 109 S. Ct. at 3046. Another provision of the statute provided that
physicians must perform viability tests before performing abortions on women they suspect
to be twenty or more weeks pregnant. The Court invalidated this section of the statute
because it conflicted with the trimester system of Roe.
71. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide whether Pennsylvania's abor-
tion statute is unconstitutional. 112 S. Ct. 931 (1992).
72. The usual exceptions include cases where the mother has been a victim of incest
or rape, and when the life of the mother is in danger because of her pregnancy.
73. 772 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. La. 1991).
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still the law in Louisiana, and apparently will continue to be until it is
overruled.
2. Analysis of the Issue of Maternal Substance Abuse Under
Roe
Because Roe is still the law, the constitutionality of prosecutions
under these types of statutes will be discussed in light of that case. The
prosecutions that have been brought under the drug delivery statutes
have only prosecuted women who ingested cocaine shortly before giving
birth. This is usually during the third trimester, so at that point, even
according to Roe, the state would have a compelling interest in the
potential life of the fetus. If a state can ban abortions during the third
trimester, it presumably can also ban substance abuse during that tri-
mester. The state's interest in protecting human life would seem to
permit both these regulations.
However, some maternal substance abuse statutes make it a crime
to give birth to a child born addicted to a controlled substance.7 4 This
does not require the connexity between ingestion and birth that the
delivery statutes do, because the mother can be prosecuted for drug use
occurring at any time in the pregnancy which results in fetal addiction.
However, a child would not be born addicted to cocaine if its mother
had not ingested any during the forty-two to seventy-two hours prior
to giving birth." Thus, if cocaine is the drug the mother was ingesting,
she would not give birth to a drug-addicted infant unless she used the
drug during the last trimester. The statutes make no distinction between
cocaine, heroin, and other drugs, so one factual issue concerning this
statute would be whether the infant was in fact "addicted," as opposed
to having a "habit," at birth.
The "addiction" statute raises another issue when examined under
the Roe trimester framework. What if a woman gives birth at the end
of the second trimester, at which point the state's interest in potential
life is not compelling? Under Roe, a state may not prohibit abortion
except during the third trimester. This "addiction" statute's application
to a woman delivering during the second trimester might be invalidated
under Roe. The counter-argument would be that the true holding of
Roe is that the state's interest in potential life becomes compelling at
viability and not at the rigid beginning of the third trimester. And since
this child was born alive, it was obviously viable. In either situation,
under Roe, the state should be able to regulate drug ingestion during
the third trimester because its interest can be said to be compelling.
74. See supra notes 4143.
75. See Moss, supra note 13.
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Minnesota's statute, however, states that "neglect includes prenatal
exposure to a controlled substance.' ' 76 This seems to punish a mother
for ingesting cocaine at any point during her pregnancy. If Louisiana
adopted such a statute, there would be an apparent conflict between
this statute and Roe, as the state does not have an interest in interfering
with the mother's autonomy during the first trimester of her pregnancy.
Such a statute purports to punish, a mother for fetal drug exposure at
any point during the pregnancy, and this seems to be an impermissible
infringement under Roe.
An analysis of this issue under the framework of Roe raises many
difficult issues. But, as discussed earlier, the holding in that case may
soon be overruled, and maternal substance abuse statutes would then
be examined under the traditional strict scrutiny analysis.
3. Strict Scrutiny Analysis of the Issue of Maternal Substance
Abuse
When a fundamental right is at stake, the Court has stated that it
will apply strict scrutiny to the statute, requiring both a compelling
governmental end and means necessary to achieve that end.7 If the
Court did overrule Roe , the analysis applied to the maternal substance
abuse statutes would still involve strict scrutiny because of the nature
of the right involved. However, the reasoning applied might not follow
that set forth by the Court in the Roe opinion. The rights of the mother
can be phrased in two ways-the right to procreation and the right to
bodily integrity.
The right to procreation has been explicitly recognized by the Court
in several areas, for example, birth control, 78 abortion, 9 and steriliza-
tion. 0 The right at stake in the issue of maternal substance abuse is
the right to continue a pregnancy without any kind of restrictions or
interference. This would include the right to ingest drugs if the mother
so desired. This type of argument focuses on the nature of reproductive
rights and the fundamental right to procreate.
The strict scrutiny analysis would require a determination of whether
punishing the mother would be a means necessary to achievement of
the state's compelling interest in protecting potential life. One way to
ensure that a child is not born addicted to drugs is to control the
actions of its mother. There is a persuasive argument that criminalization
76. See supra note 39.
77. Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967).
78. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
80. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942).
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is an effective means of control. There are also other arguments" that
criminalization is not only unnecessary, but counterproductive. Many
advocate education and more available substance abuse treatment as the
most effective means of combating this problem."1 The merits of that
argument will be discussed in a later section of this paper. The Court
will be the ultimate arbiter in determining which of these means is
"necessary" to achieve the end.
4. Possible Distinctions Between Roe and the Issue of Maternal
Substance Abuse
The activity involved in Roe and Webster, though similar in many
ways to the issue of maternal substance abuse, is markedly different
from it in one very important way. These maternal substance abuse
statutes criminalize the activity of the mother, while the statutes chal-
lenged in Roe and Webster criminalized the activity of the doctor per-
forming the abortion. This difference is crucipl because in the abortion
context, state statutes limit a woman's access to an abortion, not her
right to have one. Therefore the abortion statutes can be seen as simply
burdening a woman's right to an abortion, while in the substance abuse
arena, the statutes completely prohibit the activity. Thus maternal sub-
stance abuse statutes can be seen as an impermissible burden on preg-
nancy in a way that the abortion statutes are not.
The activity being prohibited in the abortion context is very different
from that being prohibited in the maternal substance abuse context.
With an abortion, the child's life is abruptly and definitively terminated.
There are no effects from the act; it is an end unto itself. But with
maternal drug abuse, the exact effect on each child is uncertain.' 2 Some
children will not be affected at all, and those that are will be affected
in different ways. With the right to have an abortion, a woman has a
right to end the fetus' life. With maternal substance abuse, it is uncertain
what she has the right to do. With the effects so uncertain, to punish
all pregnant women who abuse drugs would be to punish some women
whose children are not affected at all by their activity.
Arguments have also been made that a woman has a right to an
abortion, but once she forgoes that right and decides to carry her child,
she has a duty not to engage in activity potentially harmful to the
fetus.8 3 This argument raises, the issue of whether pregnant women can
be punished for non-criminal activity such as drinking alcohol and
smoking. These are activities which have also been shown to have a
81. Drug-Exposed, supra note 10, at 641-42.
82. See Toufexis, supra note 7.
83. McGinnis, supra note 60, at 518.
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detrimental effect on the fetus, but which have not been criminalized
like cocaine use.
IV. Is CRIMINALIZATION A GOOD IDEA?
Criminalization of maternal substance abuse is not an effective method
of addressing the problem of infants being exposed to drugs because it
does not address the real problem, and because punishing the mother
can cause more harm to the child. Everyone will readily agree that the
thought of a child born addicted to cocaine because its mother smoked
crack as she went into labor is a grisly and chilling thought. This is
the type of behavior that must be deterred, but criminalization is not
the answer because the problem is not the birth of the infant, but the
drug abuse of its mother. The problem is that many pregnant women
are addicted to cocaine. Punishing them for this behavior will not make
them stop using the drug, because they are addicts. Punishing the mother
also will not help her child in any way; the damage has already been
done. The remedy for this situation must be preventive rather than
punitive.
The American Medical Association has stated that "it is clear that
addiction is not simply the product of a failure of individual will-
power." ' 4 In all but a few cases, taking a harmful substance such as
cocaine is not meant to harm the fetus but to satisfy an acute psycho-
logical and physical need for that particular substance. If a pregnant
woman suffers from a substance dependency, it is the physical impos-
sibility of avoiding an impact on fetal health that causes severe damage
to the fetus, not an intentional or malicious wish to cause harm."
Therefore it is obvious that criminalization will not address the problem.
Punishing a person for something that is beyond his or her control is
not an effective deterrent to the punished behavior. There are already
criminal statutes prohibiting the use of drugs, and pregnant addicts have
obviously not been deterred by those statutes. Arguably they will remain
similarly unaffected by statutes which impose additional punishments
for substance abuse while pregnant.
Many believe that criminalization will result in great societal harm."
The California Medical Association stated:
While unhealthy behavior cannot be condoned, to bring criminal
charges against a pregnant woman for activities which may be
84. Interventions, supra note 6, at 2667 (citing Drug Abuse in the United States: A
Policy Report. In: Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 137th annual meeting of the
Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association, June 26-30. 1988).
85. Id. at 2668.
86. Spitzer, supra note 12, at 881. Spitzer argues that statutes punishing pregnant
women for substance abuse during pregnancy would encourage them to terminate or
conceal their pregnancies.
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harmful to her fetus is inappropriate. Such prosecution is coun-
terproductive to the public interest as it may discourage a woman
from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from providing ac-
curate information to health care providers out of fear of self-
incrimination. This failure to seek proper care or to withhold
vital information concerning her health could increase the risks
to herself and her baby.8 7
If women know that maternal substance abuse is criminalized, they will
be reluctant to seek prenatal care because of fear of prosecution. In
addition, an addict may find herself in a situation in which she is
initially unaware of the fact that she is pregnant. By the time she realizes
her condition, it is too late for her, without help, to stop using the
drugs. She may want to seek professional help, but in many places she
will face prosecution if she goes to a hospital in that condition.
Another problem is that there are very few available drug rehabil-
itation programs which will accept pregnant women." Jennifer Johnson,
the first woman whose conviction for maternal substance abuse was
upheld by an appellate court, tried to obtain drug treatment but was
turned away from a substance abuse treatment center.89 Major reasons
for this are the high risk and liability in a pregnancy involving drugs.9
In 1990, one study showed that eighty-seven percent of New York City's
drug abuse programs refused to treat pregnant crack addicts. 9' A National
Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors survey showed
that more than a quarter million pregnant women were turned away
from government-funded treatment programs in 1989.92 Less than twenty
percent of the drug treatment centers in the Washington, D.C. area will
treat pregnant women, regardless of whether they are on Medicaid, and
very few private treatment centers accept pregnant women at all.93 There
are only fifteen beds available for the treatment of addicted pregnant
women in Massachusetts." These women are in a situation in which
87. Interventions, supra note 6, at 2669.
88. Id. (citing Coordinating Federal and Drug Policy for Women, Infants, and Chil-
dren. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989)).
89. Derrick Z. Jackson, Inequality and the "Fetal Rights" Concept, Boston Globe,
March 25, 1990 at A24 [hereinafter Jackson).
90. Jan Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted, & Guilty?, New York Times Magazine, Aug.
19, 1990, at 44.
91. Id. at 57.
92. Magar, supra note 4. at 34.
93. Michele L. Norris, Cries in Dark Often Go Unanswered, Wash., July 2, 1991,
at Al, A8 col. 5.
94. Eileen McNamara, Birth in the "Death Zones," Boston Globe, September 12,
1990, Metro/Region at I [hereinafter McNamara). The same article stated that a 1990
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they have few choices. If they go to a hospital, they are very likely to
be prosecuted. They are arguably forced to continue their present be-
havior or go to jail. Most will opt for the continuation, which often
results in greater harm to the fetus.
The costs associated with criminalization are high. The cost per
inmate per year is $30,000 to $50,000, 9s and with an estimated 375,0009
drug-exposed infants being born each year, the total cost of keeping
these mothers in jail would be staggering.
Also, the social policy behind criminalization can be used as an
argument against it. The purpose of punishing pregnant women for
substance abuse during pregnancy is to deter them from doing it so
that their unborn children will be protected. The ultimate goal of such
statutes and prosecutions is the welfare of the child. But by taking the
child away from its'mother, it will be harmed even more.9
Another concern voiced by both sides of the debate over the propriety
of criminalization is that it could lead to punishing pregnant women
for engaging in activities that are legal but harmful to the fetus.98 An
example of this is People v. Stewart. Stewart was charged with failing
to furnish medical services under California Penal Code section 270. 99
Stewart's doctor had told her to discontinue amphetamine use during
her pregnancy, abstain from sexual intercourse, and seek medical at-
tention if she began to bleed. She delayed seeking help after beginning
to bleed, and delivered a brain dead child.' ° The judge dismissed this
case, reasoning that this statute was intended to enforce child support
arrangements rather than to punish women for activity during preg-
nancy.' 0 1 If the statute had been applicable to a pregnant woman's
activity, would Stewart's conduct have been punishable? None of her
activities were illegal, yet they resulted in harm to her fetus. Legal
activities like using alcohol and tobacco products can potentially cause
survey by the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors showed
that less than 11% of the 280,000 pregnant women nationwide who need drug treatment
actually receive care.
95. Jackson, supra note 89.
96. See Drugs, supra note 9.
97. Kenneth Jost, Mother versus Child: Law and Medicine, 75 ABA J. 84 (1989).
98. Magar, supra note 4, at 32. Both ACLU attorney Kary Moss and Charleston,
South Carolina prosecutor Charles C. Condon agree on this point.
99. The statute provides in part:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care
for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Cal. Penal Code § 270 (West 1988).
100. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Preg-
nancy, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1325 (1990).
101. Note, supra note 30, at 994.
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great harm to a fetus.'02 When legal and illegal activity result in the
same type of harm to the fetus, where is the line to be drawn in
determining what activity is punishable? If the effect on the fetus is
the same, there arguably should not be a distinction.
V. ARE OTHER METHODS OF STATE INTERVENTION WORKING?
If criminalization is not the answer to the problem of maternal
substance abuse, what is? Some women have been confined to jail for
the duration of their pregnancies, while others have had their children
taken away. Many criticisms have been made of the present system,
and this is one reason some states have turned to criminal prosecutions.
While criminal prosecutions may not be the answer, and the present
situation may not be completely effective, it may be best to leave the
status quo as it is.
First of all, there are some unique problems posed by pregnancy
which make it a sensitive issue. The first is that a woman is an au-
tonomous individual carrying the child inside her body, and monitoring
of pregnant women would be extremely difficult. If there were mandatory
treatment programs, who would ensure that all pregnant women attend
them regularly, let alone get there in the first place? With 375,000103
drug-exposed infants born each year, that means there are 375,000 women
to monitor during their entire pregnancies.
Even if there were enough drug treatment centers which did accept
pregnant women, another problem would be getting the women into
treatment. A 1986 study of treatment programs in thirty-four cities by
the National Association of Junior Leagues showed that lack of child
care was the number one reason why many women did not seek available
treatment.101 For lower income women with several children, lack of
care for their children would prevent them from obtaining treatment.
Another issue related to the large number of pregnant women who
abuse drugs is the cost associated with monitoring their newborns for
drug derivatives. Should we implement mandatory drug screening for
all newborn babies? Pregnant women cannot be forced to undergo
toxicology testing unless they are under the jurisdiction of the criminal
justice system,10 5 but newborns can be tested by a hospital without
102. Interventions, supra note 6, at 2666-67. "Cigarette smoking by pregnant women
results in higher rates of spontaneous abortion, premature birth, increased perinatal mor-
tality, low birth weight, and negative effects on later growth and development in in-
fants .... Babies born with fetal alcohol syndrome suffer from prenatal and postnatal
growth retardation; cardiovascular, limb, skull, and facial defects; impaired fine- and
gross-motor function; and impaired intellectual function."
103. See Drugs, supra note 9.
104. Norris, supra note 93, at Ag col. 6.
105. Rorie Sherman, Keeping Baby Safe From Mom, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at I,
24 col. I.
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parental consent. 10 None of the fifty states has enacted legislation re-
garding infant toxicology testing.1' Therefore, testing is at the discretion
of the health care provider, and most hospitals do not have a specific
plan for newborn toxicology testing.' t0 Many doctors are reluctant to
administer such tests, because a positive result means making a decision
whether to inform the child welfare authorities.' °9 Another problem with
the present methods of infant screening is that they are administered in
a racially biased way-physicians tend to test poor women and black
women more often." 0 If such a plan was implemented, who would pay
for all the toxicology tests? Each urine test performed costs between
$15 and $20, and the test to confirm the results costs between $100
and $200, creating a possible tab of $100 million for nationwide testing."'
This expense makes universal testing an almost impossible option.
Since the issue is state intervention to prevent fetal harm, would
such laws have to include women who drink alcohol and smoke? Or
women who do not eat enough, or eat well enough during pregnancy?
These raise phenomenal issues of monitoring, and of intrusion on the
individual rights of the mother. And where can we draw the line at
what behavior can be monitored? Many draw a distinction between
activity that is illegal and that which is not, but not eating well or
drinking alcohol, which can result in fetal alcohol syndrome, can result
in deformity as well. Deciding which behavior to punish would be a
very difficult issue, and if activities like drinking and smoking were
banned for pregnant women, these laws would be impossible to enforce.
Another possibility for state intervention is forced confinement of
the mother for the remainder of her pregnancy. Brenda Vaughan, a 30-
year old pregnant woman, was sentenced to jail until her due date after
being found guilty of forging about $700 worth of checks." 2 The judge
said that, although this first-time offense usually would not receive jail
time, he sentenced Vaughan because he wanted to protect her fetus
from her cocaine addiction.'" The constitutional issues raised by forced
confinement, either in jail or in a hospital, for the remainder of a
pregnancy, are other problems which must be analyzed. Could a woman
be forced to be confined for the duration of a pregnancy, up to possibly
106. Id.
107. Terry A. Adirim & Nandini Sen Gupta, A National Survey of State Maternal
and Newborn Drug Testing and Reporting Policies, 106 Pub. Health Rep. 292 (May/
June 1991).
108. McNamara, supra note 94.
109. Id.
10. Adirim, supra note 107, at 295.
Ill. Id.
112. Rorie Sherman, Keeping Baby Safe From Mom, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at I.
113. Id.
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eight months, to ensure the birth of a drug-free child? This option
might be the only one that would definitely produce children who had
not been exposed to drugs in utero, because it may be the only mon-
itoring option which would work. But again, at what cost? 1' And if
these mothers were jailed, without access to a treatment program, they
might resume their drug habits after they were released. Or they might
even be supplied with drugs while in jail. Confinement to a hospital
would presumably also entail mandatory drug treatment.
Another problem with forced confinement until the end of the
pregnancy is that it could remove the woman from any other children
she might have. If she had no other family, there might be no one to
care for the rest of her children. This situation is not only costly and
violative of a woman's rights, but it could be detrimental to the other
children as well. If pregnant drug abusers knew this was an option,
they might be hesitant to seek help.
Abuse and neglect proceedings are an example of post-birth inter-
vention. The state bases its allegation of neglect on the fact that the
child was exposed to drugs in utero. While most states require a finding
of potential future neglect, some courts have recently allowed evidence
of prenatal neglect (in the form of drug exposure) to suffice for removal
of custody from the mother."' In In re Baby X, a probate court
temporarily removed custody of an infant exhibiting signs of drug with-
drawal from its mother." 6 There was no evidence of post-birth neglect,
but the court held that prenatal abuse was enough to temporarily remove
custody from the mother."" A California state appellate court removed
custody from its mother of a newborn suffering from drug withdrawal." 8
While removal of custody of the child is necessary if its mother is
unable to function because of her drug addiction, many times separation
of the family only harms the child more. Many times evidence of drug
use does not indicate neglect, but only that the mother ingested drugs
a short time prior to giving birth." 9 This does not necessarily mean that
she will not care for her baby properly, and many times the child will
be better off staying with its mother. It will form natural bonds with
its real family, rather than being placed in temporary care until its
mother can rehabilitate, or in some cases being placed permanently in
a foster home. This only exacerbates the problem, because the damage
114. See Jackson, supra note 89.
115. Moss, supra note 13, at 289-92.
116. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. Il, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
117. Id. at 116, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
118. In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
1989).
119. Moss, supra note 13, at 290.
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to the child has already been done, and now the family environment
is also disrupted.
The District of Columbia's director of the Office of Alcohol and
Drug Abuse, Jackson, believes that making treatment more available is
just the first step. Rarely are all eighteen beds which are set aside
exclusively for pregnant women in the District occupied. 20 He believes
that women "are deterred by social and legal barriers such as child-
care quandaries, fear of prosecution, uncooperative spouses and the
lengthy admitting process, not to mention their own weaknesses.''
Social problems like the ones stated by Jackson work together to
make maternal substance abuse a difficult problem to address. Even if
the fear of prosecution was removed, other factors might still prevent
women from seeking help. This is the type of problem that we cannot
expect to eliminate, but we can take certain steps to prevent the frequency
of its occurrence. The important thing is that the focus of any legislation
should be on prevention rather than punishment. Women should be
encouraged to seek prenatal care and substance abuse treatment without
worrying about possible prosecution.
Whatever method is used to address this problem, the emphasis
must be on rehabilitation of pregnant drug abusers rather than punish-
ment. The deterrence factor is too great when a pregnant woman thinks
she will be punished for seeking prenatal care. Many children who could
have been helped by prenatal care would be harmed even more. States
should enact laws which require substance abuse centers to be open to
pregnant women. Missouri has already enacted such a law. 22 States
should also allocate funds to create more substance abuse centers. Other
than encouraging pregnant women to seek help, there are few effective
options. One answer might be to try to control individuals who sell or
provide drugs to pregnant women. Penalties for sale to pregnant women
could be increased. This would be problematical in that enforcement
would involve finding the individuals sold to and determining whether
they were pregnant. And certainly many addicts would say they were
not pregnant in order to obtain drugs. But if such a law were enacted
and strictly enforced, it would raise societal awareness and possibly have
an effect.
120. Michele L. Norris, Cries in the Dark Often Go Unanswered; For Drug-Addicted
Mothers. Treatment is Hard to Find, Even Harder to Stick With, Washington Post, July
2. 1991, at Al.
121. Id.
122. • S.B. 190, 86th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., 1991 Mo. Legis. Serv. 226. Section
4 states that "[a) pregnant woman referred for substance abuse treatment shall be a first
priority user of available treatment .... Substance abuse treatment facilities which receive
public funds shall not refuse to treat women solely because they are pregnant."
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VI. CONCLUSION
When children are born injured because mothers are abusing drugs,
the first reaction is to punish the woman in the hope that other women
will be deterred. But the nature of drug abuse is not conducive to this
type of deterrent, and our system ends up harming the children even
more by removing them from their families, while simultaneously doing
nothing to reduce the number of infants born each year that have been
exposed to drugs. A system that will work does not involve criminali-
zation of this behavior; it involves getting help for these women so that
they will stop harming their children by exposing them to drugs.
Julia Elizabeth Jones

